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GENUINE AND RATIONAL TEARS
SUMMARY: In this paper I examine the emotions we feel while reading a work of fiction. 
Some philosophers think that our emotional engagement with fiction gives rise to a paradox 
and involves either irrationality or participation in a game of make believe. In this paper I 
argue that an Object Theory in a Meinongian style, by supporting a realistic perspective on 
fictional emotions, is able to dissolve the paradox of fiction.
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I. 
Some philosophers think that it is difficult to explain why we can be moved to 
tears by what happens to fictional characters. Fictional characters are, needless to 
say, fictional, and hence their hurts and sorrows are nothing but the product of a 
writer’s imagination. There exists nothing to be afraid of and no one to cry for. 
Nonetheless we scream, tremble and cry. Are we pretending in responding this 
way? Or are we simply irrational? 
Neither of these questions is the right one. We have to start from the fact that 
we perfectly well know they are fictional characters and we are perfectly serious 
and rational in responding the way we do (screaming, trembling, and crying). Let’s 
take Anna Karenina’s tragic end:
“She tried to fling herself below the wheels of the first carriage as it reached 
her; but the red bag which she tried to drop out of her hand delayed her, and 
she was too late; she missed the moment. She had to wait for the next 
carriage. A feeling such as she had known when about to take the first plunge 
in bathing came upon her, and she crossed herself. That familiar gesture 
brought back into her soul a whole series of girlish and childish memories, 
and suddenly the darkness that had covered everything for her was torn apart, 
and life rose up before her for an instant with all its bright past joys. But she 
did not take her eyes from the wheels of the second carriage. And exactly at 
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the moment when the space between the wheels came opposite her, she 
dropped the red bag and drawing her head back into her shoulders, fell on her 
hands under the carriage, and lightly, as though she would rise again at once, 
dropped on to her knees. And at the same instant she was terror-stricken at 
what she was doing. ‘Where am I? What am I doing? What for?’ She tried to 
get up, to drop backwards; but something huge and merciless struck her on 
the head and rolled her on her back. ‘Lord, forgive me all’ she said, feeling it 
impossible to struggle. A peasant muttering something was working at the 
iron above her. And the light by which she had read the book filled with 
troubles, falsehoods, sorrow, and evil, flared up more brightly than ever 
before, lighted up for her all that had been in darkness, flickered, began to 
grow dim, and was quenched forever”1.
This is the most painful moment for readers. We knew, of course, that things 
were getting bad because Anna and Vronsky had become increasingly bitter toward 
each other, that a combination of boredom and suspicion had destroyed Anna’s 
mental health and that probably Vronsky was unfaithful and tired of her; yet we 
couldn’t imagine such a tragic end. We cry, remembering all the beautiful moments 
Anna and Vronsky spent together and thinking on how cruel life sometimes is.
According to many philosophers experiences as the one described clearly give 
rise to a philosophical paradox, the paradox of fiction. The paradox arises because 
we know perfectly well that a fictional character like Anna does not exist and yet 
we are saddened by her suicide. How can we be sad about something that does not 
exist (because being sad about x implies that x makes me sad, and something that 
we know does not exist cannot make me feel sad)? Here is the paradox:
(P1) We feel sad about Anna’s tragic end and we know Anna is a fictional 
character;
(P2) Believing in the existence of x (what makes us sad) is a necessary condi-
tion for having certain emotions towards x;
(P3) We do not believe in the existence of fictional characters.
We cry and despair for her suicide even if we are aware of her being a fictional 
entity. Why is it so?  This happens because the fictional entity in question exhibits 
some emotion-inducing properties specific to the emotions we feel. Let’s see how 
Object Theory not only shows how fictional entities may exhibit, or better, have, 
properties, but also how it dissolves the paradox of fiction.
1 Tolstoy, Anna Karenina, Ch. XXXI, Part 7.
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II.
Object Theory considers objects in their absolute generality2, i.e. objects 
defined only by the set of properties whose object-correlates they are3 and hence 
independently from their possibly also being for someone in some way objects of a 
particular kind. Actually, Object Theory takes into account all objects, chairs as 
well as unicorns, numbers as well as round squares, existent objects as well as 
nonexistent ones; everything which has at least one property is an object: every-
thing which is not a mere nothing is something. It does not matter if Pegasus is a 
mythological object we will never meet in the street, whereas a cat is a real object 
we can meet, nourish and stroke. These differences do not pertain to Object Theory 
itself, but to more specific sciences: zoology will of course study cats, but surely 
not winged horses, as geometry will analyze the characteristics of the triangle and 
not those of the round square. This is because zoology – unlike Object Theory – 
studies only what exists, and geometry successfully analyses possible geometrical 
forms and not impossible, contradictory ones. Hence, from this point of view, it is 
possible to be an object without being an existing object, i.e. the definition of what 
an object is does not include its possible existence. 
Once we have an object corresponding to a set of properties, we may of course 
wonder what kind of object is it: is it an existing, a fictional or an imaginary object? 
Since we are interested specifically in Anna Karenina, let’s see what kind of object 
is at stake. It is a fictional literary entity created by Lev Tolstoy and accepted (i.e. 
recognized as such) by a community of readers and critics. 
Tolstoy has generated Anna Karenina, making it be. The author is free to 
stipulate what properties a character is to have without ever being wrong4 (this is 
the essential creative freedom storytellers typically enjoy) and therefore he is the 
2 For an historical sketch on Object Theory see Nef (1998), Raspa (2002) and Bakaoukas (2003). 
The most famous Object Theory undoubtedly is Meinong’s (1904), the one I here consider as a 
constant reference point.
3 According to this definition everything which has at least one property is an object and the 
criterion for distinguishing what is an object from what is not, is the following: Pegasus is an 
object because the name ‘Pegasus’ stands for something to which certain properties correspond 
(‘being a winged horse’, ‘being Medusa’s and Poseidon’s son’, ‘being a mythological animal’), 
while on the contrary wrtgfh is not an object, because ‘wrtgfh’ does not stand for anything. On 
the problems a criterion of this sort may raise, see Salmon (1999), in particular pp. 304-308, 
Kroon (2003), especially pp. 155-157, and Caplan (2004).
4 Of course, if the author wants to write a realistic novel, as is the case in Anna Karenina, all the 
natural, physical and moral laws which are valid in our world must apply in the novel. 
Nevertheless, as happens for instance in science fiction novels, mirroring reality is neither 
relevant nor common. 
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maximal authority5 for what concerns his creatures and the properties characteriz-
ing them. Anna Karenina could in fact have been different from what it is, if 
Tolstoy’s use of language had been different, attributing to this entity different 
properties from those it actually has6. 
III.
We have now elements enough to go back to the paradox. The paradox arises 
when we read about Anna’s death and we cry, regardless of her non-existing. Is this 
normal? Is this irrational? Is this an evidence of our being part of a game of make-
believe? The argument at the basis of this somehow paradoxical situation is made 
up by three premises: 
(A1) Some people experience emotions towards characters or situations they 
take to be fictional; 
(A2) People experience emotions only if they believe that the objects of their 
emotions both exists and exhibits at least some of the emotion-inducing properties 
specific to that emotion; 
(A3) People taking fictional entities as objects of their emotions do not believe 
they exist or exhibit any emotion-inducing property. 
Here is the paradox originating when we cry for Anna Karenina.
Colin Radford7, opening the philosophical debate on fictional emotions, in a 
famous 1975 article maintains that our apparent ability to respond emotionally to 
fictional characters and events is “irrational, incoherent, and inconsistent”8. He 
argues this on the grounds that existence beliefs concerning the objects of our 
emotions are necessary for us to be moved by them, and that such beliefs are 
clearly lacking when we read works of fiction. Since such works do in fact move us 
5 For a position casting doubt on the principle according to which the author has the freedom of 
poetic license see Weatherson (2004) and the solution he proposes to the alethic puzzle.
6 Anna Karenina could have been different, but nevertheless still have remained the same object 
if, for instance, Tolstoy had attributed to her the property of having left a daughter in St. 
Petersburg instead of a son, or if he had endowed her with different properties of this sort. In 
that case the shape of the character would clearly have been preserved. And what if Tolstoy had 
attributed to her the property of being a cat? In that case, of course, we would still have an 
entity named ‘Anna Karenina’, but it would be a different one, only having the same name the 
previous object had (because the object would clearly not be the same). On problems of this 
sort, see Thomasson (1999: 56-69).
7 Radford (1975).
8 Radford (1975: 75).
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at times, Radford concludes straightforwardly that our capacity for emotional 
response to fiction is irrational.
As evidence for his argument Radford takes the case of something very tragic 
we first believed was a true account and which subsequently turns out to be false: 
once aware of this fact, according to him, we no longer feel sad or desperate as 
before, because we know it is false, it is a lie, it is a novel. He writes that “It would 
seem that I can only be moved by someone’s plight if I believe that something 
terrible has happened to him. If I do not believe that he has not and is not suffering 
or whatever, I cannot grieve or be moved to tears”9. Clearly what Radford here 
means to say is that we can only be rationally moved by someone’s plight if we 
believe that something terrible has happened to him and that if we do not believe 
that, we cannot rationally grieve or be moved to tears. But such beliefs are absent 
when we knowingly engage with fictions.
One could object to Radford that while we are engaged in the fiction, we 
somehow forget that what we are reading is a fictional work and therefore that it is 
not real: we could read about Anna Karenina’s suicide temporarily losing our 
awareness of its fictional status. To an objection of this kind, Radford would answer 
by offering two different considerations. First, if we really forgot that what we were 
reading was not real, then we would not feel any of the various forms of pleasure 
that often accompany other negative emotions (fear, pity, sadness, etc.) in fictional 
but not real-life cases. Second, the fact that we do not even try to do something, to 
react somehow: when we read about Anna throwing herself under the train, we 
have the awareness of her fictional status even while we are moved by what 
happens to her10,11. Nevertheless Radford does not offer the solution to a mysterious 
paradox, rather he stresses something strange concerning human nature: he does not 
explain how is it that we can be moved by what we perfectly know does not exist, 
all he says is that the fact of being moved by what we know does not exist is 
irrational and illogical. Nothing more.
Let’s consider the paradox again. The paradox arises because the three state-
ments seem to be true if individually considered, but when taken together they 
contradict each other. The first claims that we have a genuine emotional responses 
to fictional characters and situations; the second that we experience genuine 
emotions only for objects we believe exist; and the third that we do not believe in 
the existence of fictional objects and situations. Since these premises contradict 
each other Radford comes to the conclusion that emotional responses to fictional 
characters and events are irrational and incoherent.
9 Radford (1975: 68).
10 Radford (1975: 71).
11 Radford (1977).
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To solve the paradox we therefore need to deny or reformulate some (or at least 
one) of these premises. Pretence theorists, Kendall Walton12 in the lead, robustly 
deny premise (A1)13, i.e. that we genuinely feel sad about the tragic end of Anna 
Karenina or genuinely fear horror film entities. Walton maintains that “It seems a 
principle of common sense, one which ought not to be abandoned if there is any 
reasonable alternative, that fear must be accompanied by, or must involve, a belief 
that one is in danger”14. According to Walton, it is only make-believedly true that 
we fear horror film entities, feel sad about Anna Karenina, etc. In fact he claims 
that when, for instance, we cry for Anna’s death, what we are really doing is 
participating in a game of make-believe: we would make as if there were a woman 
committing suicide and we would then feel a quasi-emotion, quasi-sadness, which 
clearly would not be considered as true. Such situations of make-believe would 
generate fictional truths, as for instance the one saying that We are sad because of 
Anna’s death (in this case, of course, what is true is that it is fictional that we are 
sad because of Anna’s death). While crying, we are playing a game and hence ours 
are nothing but crocodile tears, fake tears15. 
According to Walton quasi-emotions differ from true ones primarily in that 
they are generated not by existence beliefs (such as the belief that the woman who 
is committing suicide really exists), but by second-order beliefs about what is 
fictionally the case according to the work in question16. This means that it is only 
make-believedly the case that we respond emotionally to fictional characters, and 
this happens because our beliefs concerning the fictional properties of those 
characters generate in us quasi-emotional states.
Many objections can be raised against Pretence Theory. The strongest is the 
one which focuses on the differences between these cases (e.g. Charles fearing the 
Green Slime) and the paradigmatic cases of games of make-believe. While propos-
ing his theory Walton makes explicit reference to the familiar games of make-
believe played by children, in which globs of mud are taken to be pies, for example, 
or games in which a father, pretending to be a monster, pursues his child and 
12 Walton (1978).
13 See also Kroon (1994).
14 Walton (1978: 6-7).
15 We can also find exasperations of positions of that sort, according to which, for instance, 
women’s tears are always fake ones. Let us remember the famous expression used by Shake-
speare in Othello (Act 4, Scene 1):  “O devil, devil! If that the earth could teem with woman’s 
tears, Each drop she falls would prove a crocodile. Out of my sight!”. 
16 “Charles believes (he knows) that make-believedly the green slime [on the screen] is bearing 
down on him and he is in danger of being destroyed by it. His quasi-fear results from this 
belief” (Walton 1978, p. 14).
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attacks him17. One such difference concerns our lack of choice: unlike children 
playing a game, while reading a novel we cannot decide which will be our emotion-
al responses. For instance we cannot simply refuse to play and prevent ourselves 
from being affected, as kids can18, nor we are able just to turn our emotional 
responses on (think about those fictional texts which simply fail to generate their 
intended emotional response). Another difference concentrates on the phenomenol-
ogy of the two cases: it is simply not true to ordinary experience that consumers of 
fictions are in emotional states similar to those typical of make-believe games when 
watching movies, reading books, and the like19,20. The experience of reading and 
enjoying literature isn’t a sort of adult game we take part in21: actually it is a totally 
different experience, more deep and complex (ontologically speaking, of course) 
than classical adult games are.
Another possibility to solve the paradox is, following a classical line of 
thought, to deny premise (A2), i.e. that existence beliefs are a necessary condition 
for genuine emotional responses. In fact we could reasonably maintain that, al- 
though our emotional responses to actual characters require beliefs in their exis-
tence, there is no good reason to hold up this particular kind of emotional response 
as the absolute model for understanding emotional response in general. What 
makes emotional response to fiction different from emotional response to real 
world characters is that, rather than having to believe in the actual existence of the 
entity in question, all we need do is to ‘present’ it to ourselves22 believing that it is 
something and not a mere nothing. Hence the only kinds of beliefs we need have 
when engaging with fictions would be beliefs in those properties characters have 
17 Walton (1978: 13).
18 “[…] if it [the fear produced by horror films] were a pretend emotion, one would think that it 
could be engaged at will. I could elect to remain unmoved by The Exorcist; I could refuse to 
make believe I was horrified. But I don't think that that was really an option for those, like 
myself, who were overwhelmedly struck by it” (Carroll 1990: 74).
19 “[…] many theatre-goers and readers believe that they are actually upset, excited, amused, 
afraid, and even sexually aroused by the exploits of fictional characters. It seems altogether 
inappropriate in such cases to maintain that our theatre-goers merely make-believe that they are 
in these emotional states” (Novitz 1987: 241).
20 Carroll strongly claims that “Walton’s theory appears to throw out the phenomenology of the 
state [here ‘art-horror’] for the sake of logic” (Carroll 1990: 74); in fact, in contrast with kids 
playing make-believe, when responding to works of fiction we do not seem to be absolutely 
aware of playing any games.
21 For the idea that emotional engagement with art is not best thought at as a game, see also 
Levinson (1996: 287-307).
22 Lamarque (1981) speaks about ‘mental representation’, Carroll (1990) about ‘entertainment in 
thought’ and Smith (1995) of ‘imaginative proposal’. 
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and that make them funny, stupid, frightening, pathetic, and so on. In the next 
section I will pursue this second way of solving the paradox23 which is compatible 
with Object Theory and its assumptions.
We could find a further solution to the paradox24 also denying premise (A3) and 
suggesting a concept of weak (or partial) belief. In this case the emotions involved 
in response to fictional characters would be weaker if compared with those we 
experience in response to real life persons. To experience emotions for characters, 
many people need to have a sort of “willing suspension of disbelief”. This phrase 
was coined by Samuel Taylor Coleridge25, according to whom creating a suspension 
of disbelief means creating a different kind of emotions from those experienced in 
real life. Nevertheless this third solution implies strong behavioral differences 
between our emotional responses to real versus fictional characters26.
IV.
The solution I find most interesting is the one questioning if existence beliefs 
are a necessary condition for genuine emotional responses. According to the 
realistic position I here maintain, essentially based on Object Theory, all we need in 
order to have a genuine emotional response is to believe in the properties character-
23 Radford powerfully rejects this second way out: “Lamarque claims that I am frightened by ‘the 
thought’ of the green slime. That is the ‘real object’ of my fear. But if it is the moving picture of 
the slime which frightens me (for myself), then my fear is irrational, etc., for I know that what 
frightens me cannot harm me. So the fact that we are frightened by fictional thoughts does not 
solve the problem but forms part of it” (Radford 1977: 261-62).
24 Levinson (1997: 22-27) outlines seven different solutions to the paradox: the non-intentionalist 
solution,  the suspension-of-disbelief solution, the surrogate-object solution, the antijudgmen-
talist solution, the surrogate-belief solution, the irrationalist solution and the make-believe, or 
imaginary, solution. But for my purposes the two sketched here are enough in order to explain 
how Object Theory could easily dissolve the paradox of fiction.   
25 Coleridge coined the phrase ‘Suspension of disbelief’ in his Biographia Literaria (1817): “[...] 
it was agreed, that my endeavours should be directed to persons and characters supernatural, or 
at least romantic, yet so as to transfer from our inward nature a human  interest and a sem-
blance of truth sufficient to procure for these shadows of imagination that willing suspension of 
disbelief for the moment, which constitutes poetic faith” (Ch. XIV).
26 Even when the existence beliefs are of the weak or partial variety, Walton argues that: “Charles 
has no doubts about whether he is in the presence of an actual slime. If he half believed, and 
were half afraid, we would expect him to have some inclination to act on his fear in the normal 
ways. Even a hesitant belief, a mere suspicion, that the slime is real would induce any normal 
person seriously to consider calling the police and warning his family. Charles gives no thought 
whatever to such courses of action” (Walton 1978: 7).
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izing specific fictional entities and events. Since we believe in some properties 
Anna has – i.e. the property of being desperate and abandoned, the property of 
being rejected by her friends, and the property of falling under a train – this is 
enough to feel sad.
My main concern here is ontological and not psychological, and this makes 
clear why I am not interested in explaining what happens in people’s minds while 
they read novels or what is the difference between reading about Anna Karenina’s 
death and about Diana Spencer’s death; what I mostly mean here is to point out that 
fictional entities are objects, that they are characterized by specific properties, and 
hence that there is something – in this case some properties characterizing Anna 
Karenina – I am directed to when I cry. 
On the one hand, according to the paradox of fiction set forth by Radford, there 
is a problem with fictional emotions because in those situations there seems to be 
no object, i.e. no existing object. In his original article, he asks: “We are saddened, 
but how can we be? What are we sad about? How can we feel genuinely and 
involuntarily sad, and weep, as we do knowing as we do that no one has suffered or 
died?”27. On the other hand, and in contrast with Radford’s point of view, Object 
Theory maintains that being an object and being an existing object are not one and 
the same thing: something – like Anna Karenina, Pegasus or even the round square 
– can be an object without being an existing one. From this perspective the paradox 
does not arise: 
(S1) We feel sad about Anna’s tragic end and we know that Anna is a fictional 
character (and therefore that she does not exist);
(S2) To believe that there is (and not that there exists) an object exhibiting 
some of the emotion-inducing properties specific to sadness is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for being sad about it (i.e. the emotion has to be directed 
towards something);
(S3) We do believe that there are fictional characters exhibiting emotion-
inducing properties (e.g. there is a fictional character whose name is Anna Karenina 
and whose end is tragic).
Distinguishing between being and existing, Object Theory makes it possible to 
identify an object (a fictional object, Anna Karenina) causing a specific emotion 
(sadness), even if that object does not exist. That is precisely the way the paradox 
disappears. Therefore the hypothesis of irrationality together with the hypothesis of 
make-believe can definitively be abandoned thanks to a realistic theory of fictional 
emotions according to which the necessary and sufficient condition for an emotion 
to be genuine and rational is to be directed towards an object exhibiting some of the 
27 Radford (1975: 77).
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emotion-inducing properties. And an emotion directed towards a fictional object 
clearly is directed towards an object exhibiting some of the emotion-inducing 
properties.
This means that we mustn’t believe in the existence of Anna in order to be 
concerned for her and, to explain why we do not even try to intervene in what 
happens (for instance preventing her from committing suicide), it is enough to 
disbelieve in her existence. In fact what we just believe in is the being of an object, 
a fictional object, characterized by specific properties. That genuine emotions can 
be generated in us by non-existing persons (as fictional characters are) should not 
surprise: don’t we register genuine feelings for dead persons, past and future 
situations, dreams and daydreams? Actually we do not need believing in the 
existence of something in order to be involved with it: I can cry for a never-born 
son and I can feel excited by a possible lover. Are they existing entities? Surely not. 
But they are something, at least they are those objects my emotions are focused on. 
It is now clear how the paradox of fiction disappears: when we cry for Anna 
Karenina we are neither weeping crocodile tears nor we are irrational; on the 
contrary we are experiencing genuine and rational emotions. Nonetheless, even if 
we are authentically moved, we do not try to comfort Anna or save her28, and this 
because we perfectly know that she is a fictional character and therefore that we 
can not have a causal power on her (probably Tolstoy could have had, but that is 
another matter). 
It is true that the emoter disbelieves in any real reference of his feelings, yet he 
believes in a fictional reference of them. The emotion thus produced is real and is 
directed towards a fictional entity. Our disbelief in the existence of the object – and 
our consequent belief in its being fictional – does not preclude us from being 
moved by it. We pity Anna and do not try to communicate with her or stop her from 
committing suicide because we are aware of her being fictional and we realize that 
it is impossible to help her, yet we are moved. This, far from being an evidence of 
our irrationality is a proof of our being totally rational.
28 In fact, as Brock (2007: 217) underlines, we also do not experience emotions such as shame, 
embarrassment or remorse, and this happens because we are aware about the kind of ontologi-
cal status fictional characters have: for instance, to regret our actions towards someone is 
somehow to believe that there is an existent person towards which we might have acted 
differently. But we do not believe so. We couldn’t have acted differently to any fictional entity 
for the simple reason that we do not act towards any (hence we can not regret or be ashamed 
for our actions towards any of them). We are ontologically cut-off from having such kind of 
interactions with fictional entities.  
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V. 
It is now time to ask29: but how can we look for and then enjoy these fears and 
sorrows? If the previous inquiry concerned the paradox of fiction (where the main 
question was: How can we experience genuine and rational emotions towards 
fictional entities?), this latter is about the paradox of tragedy and horror pertaining 
those negative emotions we intentionally feel reading tragedies or watching horror 
movies. 
One obvious way to solve the paradox is maintaining that we enjoy fear and 
sorrow precisely because we know that they do not concern real entities, but 
fictional ones, hence there isn’t anyone who really suffered or died. 
But is this really what happens? Do we really enjoy fears and sorrows (even if 
they refer to fictional entities)? Do we take pleasure in screaming (because we are 
frightened) and crying (because we are sad)? If so, we would undoubtedly be 
somehow irrational looking for something that definitely will make us suffer. 
I think that here the right solution dates back to Hume30: what we are pleasured 
by aren’t the sufferings of the characters, but the style and form of the work. 
Negative emotions are still there, but they are accompanied by (and never mixed 
with) pleasure and joy. 
It is reasonable to suppose that the paradox of fiction grew out of the paradox 
of tragedy: the general problem in fact arises not simply for the emotions we feel 
for fictional entities, but for those negative emotions we experience towards them. 
How can we fear the Green Slime? How can we pity Anna Karenina? Hence from 
the paradox of tragedy and terror, the paradox of fiction directly follows: why do 
we care for fictional entities that clearly do not exist? This paper is an attempt to 
answer this question by dissolving the paradox.
So, we cry for Anna Karenina, not for nothing, not for an existing person 
whose destiny was similar to Anna’s, nor for an abstract entity: we cry for a woman 
who, in a jealous rage, commits suicide by throwing herself in the path of a train, 
we cry because we remember how beautiful and passionate Anna and Vronsky were 
during the mazurka at the ball in Moscow and, in the end, we cry because we 
29 Brock (2007: 226) stresses the fact that the paradox of tragedy concerns two different questions 
that should be considered separately: one problem is the one concerning our being interested in 
proving negative emotions (and this is not actually a paradox, but something more similar to a 
conflict in our desires), another is the one concerning the pleasure we get from these painful 
emotions (and this is a paradox because it looks like a conceptual impossibility that emotions 
like fear, pity and sorrow which are unpleasant experiences, make us find the experience of 
being emotionally affected by them a pleasant one). Brock calls the first “Aristotle’s puzzle” 
and this second “Humean puzzle”.
30 Hume (1757).
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understand how true were the opening lines of the novel, “Happy families are all 
alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own way”. 
In order to have genuine and rational emotions we need an object causing them 
(it is not by chance that, for someone who starts crying without any reason – and 
‘reason’ here is a synonym for ‘object’ – we would not say “she is sad”, but “she is 
depressed”). According to the theory outlined here, fictional entities derive both 
from the attribution of internal and of external properties; insofar, being the 
correlate of sets of properties, fictional entities are objects. That is why it is neither 
irrational nor absurd for anyone to cry for Anna Karenina’s death: because there is 
an object (even if a fictional one) we are crying for and, from an ontological point 
of view, that is enough. 
While maintaining Object Theory we therefore solve the paradox of fiction by 
dissolving it: there is no paradox because there is an object. Hence the tears we 
shed for Anna aren’t crocodile tears: our weeping is not false or insincere, and what 
we display are genuine emotions. This does not mean, of course, that to produce 
tears is always symptom of sadness, as the crocodile’s example clearly shows (and 
differently from what legends on crocodiles tell us): crocodiles, in fact, can and do 
generate tears, even if they do not cry for remorse, sadness or something of that 
sort31. But this, obviously, is another story32. 
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Prave i racionalne suze
(Apstrakt)
U ovom tekstu istražujem emocije koje osećamo prilikom čitanja dela fikcije. Neki 
filozofi misle da naše emocionalno angažovanje povezano sa fikcijom vodi do paradoksa i 
uključuje ili iracionalnost ili učestvovanje u igri stvaranja verovanja. U ovom tekstu ar- 
gumentujem da je neka teorija predmeta u majnongijanskom stilu, podržana realističkom 
perspektivom fikcionalnih emocija, u stanju da obesnaži paradoks fikcije.
KLJUČNE REČI: emocije, fikcija, paradoks, racionalnost, prave.
